Discussion
In this paper we have investigated ways to incorporate both internal and external nondeterministic actions in a system that formalizes the reasoning of agents on their abilities and the e ects of the actions that they perform. To this end we de ned the notions ofnite computation sequences and nite computation runs: these are nite strings of atomic actions and tests. The results that we obtain seem to be intuitively correct. Our further research regarding the topics introduced in this paper will mainly be focused on two points: rstly we would like to de ne a uni ed framework in which internal and external nondeterminism can be combined, and secondly it seems interesting to investigate a rst-order variant of the framework de ned in this paper, in which it is possible that the agents reason with and about the sequences of semi-atomic actions that constitute an action.
6.26. Definition. The Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate are de ned as follows:
Can i ( ; ') K i (<do i ( )>'^A i ). Cannot i ( ; ') K i (: <do i ( )>' _ :A i ).
The following lemma formalizes the intuitively acceptable behaviour of the predicates.
6.27. Lemma. For all agents i, actions 1 ; 2 2 Ac E , and for all formula ' we have: j = Can i ( 1 + 2 ; ') $ Can i ( 1 ; ')^Can i ( 2 ; '). j = Cannot i ( 1 ; ') _ Cannot i ( 2 ; ') ! Cannot i ( 1 + 2 ; '). 6 j = Cannot i ( 1 + 2 ; ') ! Cannot i ( 1 ; ') _ Cannot i ( 2 ; ').
Proof of lemma 6.27: The proof of the rst two cases is left to the reader. The third case is proved by the following model:
M =< S; ; R; r; c > where (1) S = fs 0 ; s 1 ; s 2 g, (2) (p; s j ) = 1 , j = 2, (3) R(i) = (fs 0 ; s 1 g fs 0 ; s 1 g) f(s 2 ; s 2 )g, (4) r(i; a 1 )(s 0 ) = r(i; a 2 )(s 1 ) = s 2 , r(i; a j )(s k ) = ; otherwise, (5) c(i; a 1 )(s 0 ) = c(i; a 2 )(s 1 ) = 1, c(i; a j )(s k ) = 0 otherwise.
Now we have:
M; s 0 j = Cannot i (a 1 + a 2 ; p), since fs j (s 0 ; s) 2 R(i)g = fs 0 ; s 1 g and (A i (a 1 + a 2 ); s j ) = 0 for j = 0; 1. M; s 0 6 j = Cannot i (a 1 ; p) since (<do i (a 1 )>p^A i a 1 ; s 0 ) = 1 and M; s 0 6 j = Cannot i (a 2 ; p) since (<do i (a 2 )>p^A i a 2 ; s 1 ) = 1. Hence the model M indeed shows the third case.
In lemma 6.27 it is in a nice way expressed that the external choice is completely out of the control of the agent. In particular the fact that the implication in the last case of lemma 6.27 is not valid seems reasonable: for should the agent conclude from the fact that s/he knows that 1 + 2 is either incorrect or unfeasible that one of 1 and 2 is incorrect or unfeasible, s/he seems to have some knowledge concerning the choice that the external environment makes. This would contradict our intuitive ideas as given in section 3. Despite the intuitively nice behaviour of the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate when de ned as in 6.26, it could be interesting to investigate other de nitions of these predicates that resemble the de nitions given in section 5.2. For these alternative de nitions the extension to a rst-order framework could be necessary.
, (A i 1^Ai 2 ; s) = 1 , M; s j = (A i 1^Ai 2 ) 6.1. Composite actions revisited As in section 5.1, we will reconsider the validities proved in HLM93], this time in the light of the semantics given for the external nondeterministic choice. It turns out that for events the same validities hold as found for the internal nondeterministic choice, i.e., theorem 5.13 also holds for the semantics given in de nition 6.11. Also theorem 5.14 holds for the semantics for the external nondeterministic choice, this completely in accordance with our intuition. As was the case with the internal nondeterministic choice, the behaviour of the sequential composition and the repetitive composition di ers from that observed in HLM93]. Furthermore, the behaviour of the sequential composition is for the semantics of de nition 6.11 di erent from the behaviour for the semantics of section 5.
6.25. Theorem. For all agents i, actions 1 ; 2 ; 3 2 Ac I , and for all formulae ' we have:
(1) j = A i ( 1 ; 2 ) ! A i 1^ Proof of theorem 6.25: In the rst case corollary 6.21 is used, the proof of the other cases is similar to the proof of theorem 5.15, and is therefore left to the reader.
Note that the rst two cases of theorem 6.25 are associated with the observations made in example 4.2. The third and the fourth case represent the intuitively desired behaviour of the sequential composition when an external nondeterministic choice is involved.
The Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate reconsidered
The problems with the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate that occurred in the internal nondeterministic case do not occur with the external nondeterministic one. The semantics for the external nondeterministic choice as given in de nition 6.11 is such that the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate express an intuitively acceptable behaviour when de ned by the syntactical abbreviations that are also used in HLM93].
As a consequence of proposition 6.23 we have that it holds that M; s 0 j = A i and M; s 0 6 j =<do i ( )>tt. Consider the Kripke model M as given in the following picture and such that (p; s 0 ) = (q; s 0 ) = (p; s 1 ) = 1 and (q; s j ) = 0 for j = 1; : : :; 4 and (p; s j ) = 0 for j = 2; 3; 4. The following theorem shows that our semantics for the external nondeterministic choice behaves as desired.
6.24. Theorem. For all agents i, actions 1 ; 2 2 Ac E , and for all formulae ' we have: j =<do i ( 1 + 2 )>' $ (<do i ( 1 )>'^<do i ( 2 )>'). j = A i ( 1 + 2 ) $ (A i 1^Ai 2 ).
Proof of theorem 6.24:
First case:
M; s j =<do i ( 1 + 2 )>' , (<do i Since the agent is not capable of performing all of the atomic sequences that constitute the action , s/he is not able to perform . This is exactly the outcome as we intuitively expected it to be Assume that M is the Kripke model for which the atomic actions are for agent i as given in the following picture. composition. The fact that in section 5 a correspondence does seem to exist between the conditional if ' then 1 else 2 fi on one side, and the internal nondeterministic choice (confirm '; 1 ) (confirm :'; 2 ) on the other side, is a consequence of the fact that the imposed choice in the conditional has the same behaviour as the angelic nondeterministic choice with regard to the results of events and abilities.
The following lemmas and theorems sum up some of the properties of Term, CS and CR. of the function. However the de nition as it is given is such that some interesting and intuitively desirable relations exist between the set of nite computation runs and the set of nite computation sequences (see theorems 6.18 and 6.20, lemmas 6.15 and 6.17, and corollaries 6.19 and 6.21).
6.14. Remark. Note that in the de nition of the nite computation runs the conditional and the repetitive composition are not considered to be some sort of degenerated (external) nondeterministic choice, this in contrast with the usual approach in dynamic logic (cf. HR83], Har84], KT90], Gol92]). In our opinion the approach that we take in denition 6.11 is an intuitively better one than the standard dynamic logic approach. Since compared to the nondeterministic choice, the conditional does not comprise any real choice since the choice as to perform the then part or the else part is completely determined by the value of the condition; this is an imposed choice that has nothing to do with either the agent or the external environment surrounding the agent making a choice. An analogous line of reasoning can be given for the repetitive composition. The treatment of the conditional and the repetitive composition in de nition 6.11 is based on our conviction that these action constructors are essentially deterministic by nature: in a given state s it is for a given conditional if ' then 1 else 2 fi completely xed whether 1 or 2 is performed. This depends only on the truth value of the conditional ', and is by no means nondeterministic. Also for the repetitive composition it can be determined on beforehand whether the action in the body of the while will be performed, since this depends only on the truth or falsity of the ' in while ' do 1 od. This intuition is clearly visible in the de nitions of the nite computation runs for the conditional and the repetitive j 1 ; 2 j = j 1 j + j 2 j = CS( ) non-terminating event, the set of nite computation runs of for the agent and the state is equal to the singleton set ffailg. If none of the nite computation sequences of action results in an in nitely non-terminating event for i in s, the set of nite computation runs of is de ned inductively. In this inductive de nition it is taken into account that, depending on the truth or falsity of the condition, only some of the nite computation sequences of a conditional or a repetitive composition are nite computation runs. Note in particular that the set of nite computation runs of an action is determined by the context of the action, i.e., the agent that executes the action and the state in which it is executed, and is no longer determined by syntax alone.
To check whether an action , for a given agent i and a state s, can be executed in such a way that an in nitely non-terminating event results, the predicate Term is used. The de nition of this predicate is a rather straightforward formalization of the idea that innite events result in in nitely many state transitions. If we assume that execution of semi-atomic actions takes one execution cycle, then execution of an action that results in an in nitely non-terminating event takes more than k execution cycles, for all k 2 IN. To successfully de ne the termination predicate according to this intuition we de ne for basic actions the notion of one action being the pre x of another action, and the notion of the norm of an action, representing the number of execution cycles it would take an agent to execute the action. The pre x predicate is necessary to successfully deal with in nite while-actions; the need for this predicate is caused by the de nition of the computation sequences for the whileactions. If we consider for instance the action def = while tt do skip od in a given state s for a given agent i, it is obvious that execution of by i results in in nitely many state transitions from s to s. However, the set of nite computation sequences of fails to express this: since all nite computation sequences of are of the form 0 ; confirm , all of these computation sequences result in voidly non-terminating events! The de nition of Term as we give it, i.e., using the pre x predicate, can cope with the situation sketched above: for all natural numbers k a natural number n k exists such that for some nite computation sequence is in nitely non-terminating in all states s, for all agents i.
After this, hopefully explanatory, introduction the actual de nitions of the various predicates can be given. Example 6.3 clearly shows the problems that are associated with using the de nition ( ) (an analogous problem occurs with the de nition ( )): due to the fact that the set of nite computation sequences of an action is determined by the syntax of alone, this set contains some sequences that should be left out of consideration in certain states for certain agents. For instance, the action if ' then skip else fail fi should have confirm '; skip as the only relevant computation sequence in states in which ' holds.
To correctly deal with external nondeterminism, the relevant computation sequences of a given action, for a given agent in a given state, need somehow be singled out. We will call these relevant sequences the nite computation runs of the action, given an agent and a state. Before we give the de nition of the nite computation runs some additional terminology is necessary. Since may contain external nondeterministic choices, for < do i ( ) > ' to hold it is demanded that no way of executing exists such that a non-terminating event results; for in case of a non-terminating event certainly no end state exists, which is demanded for <do i ( )>' to be true. For A i to hold it is necessary that no way of executing exists such that an in nitely non-terminating event results: since people die and machines break down, agents cannot be expected to be able to perform actions that result in in nitely non-terminating events. Note that it is possible that agents are able to perform actions that would lead to voidly non-terminating events (for instance the action that consists of washing hair in the shampoo example of section 2); it is therefore possible that actions resulting in a state s for an agent i in voidly non-terminating events still are relevant. For these reasons the de nition of nite computation runs is such that if some computation sequence of an action results, for a given agent i in a given state s, in an in nitely Lemma 5.19 clearly expresses the idea of agent i being in control: the agent knows that an internal nondeterministic choice between two actions is correct and feasible if and only if one of the actions to be chosen is. Since the choice is completely free to the agent, this is what one intuitively would expect.
Introducing external nondeterminism
Next we will try and incorporate external nondeterminism into the system given in section 2. As in the case of internal nondeterminism, we start with extending the language L.
6.1. Definition. The language L E is an extension of the language L. For the language L E the class of actions Ac as given in de nition 2.2 is extended by the following, thus obtaining the class Ac E of actions.
::= 1 + 2
The class of basic actions based on L E is de ned in the obvious way: correct and feasible plan to stay alive. This is a consequence of the fact that not all possible ways of doing b h lead to states in which the agent is alive. But since the agent decides which action to perform, the demand that all possible ways of doing an (internal nondeterministic) action lead to the desired goal is a counterintuitive one in the rst place. Therefore de nition (z) is also to be rejected.
In order to ensure that the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate behave in an intuitively acceptable way in the situations sketched in the examples above, we will for the internal nondeterministic case abandon the idea of de ning the Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate as syntactical abbreviations. Instead we will treat these predicates as independent ones that have their own semantics. It will not come as a surprise that the unravelling of actions again plays an important part in this semantics. Hence the agent concludes that s/he has a correct and feasible plan to become rich! Since this conclusion is highly undesired, de nition (y) is to be rejected.
To avoid the kind of counterintuitive behaviour as expressed in example 5.16, the Canpredicate needs to be modi ed. A rst possible attempt to modify the Can-predicate could be to demand that all possible ways of doing lead to the truth of ', thus ending up with the following de nition:
However de nition (z) does not yield intuitively acceptable results either:
5.17. Example (The living agent). Consider the situation of an agent i that has a zest for living. The agent knows that breathing keeps him/her alive and also that if s/he holds his/her breath for half an hour, s/he would no longer be alive. The agent furthermore knows that s/he is capable of breathing and not able to hold his/her breath for half an hour. A possible formalization of this situation is given by the model M =< S; ; R; r; c >, where b is the act of breathing, h is the act of holding your breath, and l stands for the agent being alive.
(1) S = fs 0 ; s 1 g, This su ces to conclude that case 2 holds.
In our opinion theorems 5.13 to 5.15 show that our semantics are intuitively acceptable. The rst two cases of theorem 5.15 are associated with the properties observed in example 4.1 and in the rst example of 5.10.
The Can-predicate and the Cannot-predicate reconsidered
To formalize the knowledge of agents concerning correctness and feasibility of their plans with respect to a given goal we used in HLM93] a completely modi ed version of the Can-predicate, originally de ned by Robert Moore ( Moo80], Moo84]).
Intuitively the Can-predicate Can i ( ; ') expresses the fact that agent i knows that is a correct and feasible plan to achieve the goal '. As already indicated in section 2, correctness of with respect to ' is formalized by <do i ( )> ' and feasibility of for For the deterministic case this de nition turned out to be intuitively perfectly acceptable (see HLM93]). However as soon as internal nondeterministic actions are involved some awkward situations come into being: 5.16. Example (The poor agent). Consider the situation of a poor agent i. The agent knows that making money by magic would make her/him rich, but of course s/he is incapable of doing so. This situation is formalized in the model M =< S; ; R; r; c >, where a is the act of making money by magic, and r stands for richness.
(1) S = fs 0 ; s 1 g, (2) (r; s 0 ) = 0; (r; s 1 ) = 1, (3) R(i) = f(s 0 ; s 0 ); (s 1 ; s 1 )g, Proof of theorem 5.13: The rst three cases are straightforward, since it holds that CS( ) = , for = skip; fail; confirm '. Also case 5 is easy to prove. Since the proof of case 6 is analogous to that of case 4, we will prove case 4 only; equivalences that are standard for rst-order logic (see for instance Gam91]) are assumed to be familiar and are therefore used throughout this proof without mentioning them. (1) S = fs j j j 2 INg (2) (p; s j ) = 0 , j = 2, (q; s j ) = 1 , j = 2.
(3) R is arbitrary.
(4) r: see picture below for the action transitions for agent i. The following theorem shows that our semantics for the internal nondeterministic choice behaves as desired. Since events and abilities are separate concepts, it it important to note that whenever in an example in this paper two states are connected via an arrow this is an events only arrow, which has nothing to do with the actual abilities of the agent in question. Since the agent is capable of performing one of the atomic sequences that constitute the action , s/he is able to perform . This is exactly the outcome as we intuitively expected it to be.
Assume that M is the Kripke model for which the function r is for agent i as in the following picture. Let action be given by def = (a 1 a 2 ); (a 3 a 4 ). We have the following for M: CS( ) = f 1 ; 2 j 1 2 CS(a 1 a 2 ); 2 2 CS(a 3 a 4 )g = f 1 ; 2 j 1 2 fa 1 ; a 2 g; 2 2 fa 3 ; a 4 gg = fa 1 ; a 3 ; a 1 ; a 4 ; a 2 ; a 3 ; a 2 ; a 4 g Let M be the Kripke model given by:
Notation. To keep our notation compact we will sometimes use the following abbrevia- Proof of lemma 5.7: By induction on the structure of : the cases for atomic actions, con rmations, conditional composition, and repetitive composition are straightforward from de nition 5.5; these cases do not use the induction hypothesis. In the other cases the induction hypothesis is used.
Having introduced the notion of nite computation sequences, the semantics t to cope in an intuitively acceptable way with the internal nondeterministic choice can be de ned. choices. The idea behind the semantics as we give it, is that the meaning of a composite action is determined by the meaning of the sequences of (atomic) actions that constitute it: for instance, in example 4.1, the meaning of = (a 1 a 2 ); a 3 is determined by the meaning of the sequences a 1 ; a 3 and a 2 ; a 3 .
Introducing internal nondeterminism
In this section we try and extend the de nitions of section 2 such that internal nondeterminism is adequately dealt with. In particular example 4.1 should be treated in an intuitively acceptable way. We start with extending the syntax in an obvious way.
5.1. Definition. The language L I is an extension of the language L. For the language L I the class of actions Ac as given in de nition 2.2 is extended by the following, thus obtaining the class Ac I of actions.
::= 1 2
As touched upon at the end of section 4, the unraveling of composite actions into the sequences of (atomic) actions that constitute them will be the basis of the semantics that we de ne. This unraveling is done using nite computation sequences, as de ned in KT90].
A nite computation sequence of a given action is a nite length string of atomic actions and tests, representing a possible sequence of atomic steps that may occur in a halting execution of some event do i ( ). Proof of lemma 5.4: By induction on the structure of .
de nes the for events, we would have to conclude that i is not capable of :
(1) M; s 0 j = A i (a 1 a 2 ) since M; s 0 j = A i a 1 , (2) M; s 0 6 j = do i (a 1 a 2 )]A i a 3 , since M; s 0 6 j = do i (a 2 )]A i a 3 , (3) hence M; s 0 6 j = A i (a 1 a 2 )^ do i (a 1 a 2 )]A i a 3 , and thus M; s 0 6 j = A i .
In our opinion this is not the intuitively correct approach towards sequential composition.
Example (External nondeterminism and sequential composition).
Consider the Kripke model M =< S; ; R; r; c > given by:
(1) S = fs 0 ; s 1 g.
(2) is arbitrary.
(3) R is arbitrary. Intuitively agent i is incapable of = (a 1 + a 2 ); a 3 in s 0 : s/he is capable of a 1 and a 2 in s 0 , but since the only possible execution of a 1 leads to a state in which the agent is incapable of a 3 , s/he is incapable of a 1 ; a 3 , i.e., in the terminology of section 1, the agent is incapable of performing one of the actions constituting . Using a Peleg-like semantics for events would result in the equivalence
whereas a Goldblatt-like semantics would yield
as a de ning equivalence 1 . Regardless of which of these equivalences is used in the approach suggested above, we have to conclude that the agent is capable of in s 0 :
( To avoid confusion both equivalences are expressed using our notation.
seems to be correct: although in case of an external nondeterministic choice 1 + 2 only one of 1 and 2 is performed, the agent has to be prepared to deal with execution of both, and hence reasons about the e ect of this action as if both actions were actually executed. Although abilities are not considered in CDL it seems that our treatment of the external nondeterministic choice is intuitively also a correct one for concurrency: an agent is able to perform the actions 1 and 2 in parallel i both actions belong to the abilities of the agents. Hence our treatment of the external nondeterministic choice might as well be taken to be one for the concurrency operator, i.e., besides two sorts of nondeterminism, we also (implicitly) touch upon concurrency in this paper.
Why the obvious approach will not do
Both in Pel87] and Gol92] a semantics for events is given that deals with the concurrency operator \, which bears a close resemblance to our external nondeterministic choice +, and the nondeterministic choice operator , which shows the same behaviour as our . One could be tempted to introduce nondeterminism/concurrency into the system of HLM93] by using a Peleg/Goldblatt approach towards the semantics for events, and extending the semantics for abilities by adding the clause Intuitively agent i is capable of = (a 1 a 2 ); a 3 in s 0 : s/he is capable of a 1 , and since all possible executions of a 1 lead to states in which s/he is capable of a 3 , it is clear that the agent is capable of a 1 ; a 3 , i.e., in the terminology of section 1, the agent is capable of performing one of the actions constituting . Should we use the semantics suggested above, in which the equivalence For the reasoning of the agent concerning his/her abilities for an external nondeterministic choice = 1 + 2 an analogous line of reasoning can be given:
Since the external environment makes the choice between 1 and 2 , it is possible that I am capable of performing 1 + 2 if and only if I am able to perform both of the actions.'
The semantics for the internal and the external nondeterministic choice, given in section 5 and section 6 respectively, are based on the observations given above.
3.1. Remark. Note that the choice as of agents showing an angelic, and the external environment showing a demonic behaviour is a somewhat arbitrary one. In fact the de nitions that we give are such that the opposite situation, or any of the four possible situations, can equally well be formalized.
A comparison with some other approaches
As far as we know no formal systems exist that treat abilities in a way similar to ours, let alone systems that consider abilities for nondeterministic actions. Nevertheless some systems exist that for events either distinguish the two sorts of nondeterminism as discussed at the beginning of section 3, or deal with the related notion of concurrency. We will brie y consider two such systems: one is the system of Mey92], in which internal and external nondeterminism are considered for events, the other one is the system of Pel87] that deals with concurrency. The system of Mey92] is based on the following two equivalences:
It turns out that Meyer's starting point is exactly the opposite of ours! This di erence is caused by the fact that in Meyer's system an external observer is reasoning about the e ect of the actions performed by some agent/actor. The external observer has the implicit assumption that the agent shows a demonic behaviour, and that the external environment shows an angelic one. Thus the approach of Meyer is not in contradiction with ours: a shift in perspective causes these two approaches to behave di erently.
In Pel87] Concurrent Dynamic Logic (CDL) is de ned. In CDL the operator \ is used to combine two actions 1 and 2 into a new action, with intuitive meaning` 1 and 2 in parallel'. The operator \ is such that the following is a valid formula:
Peleg's approach is based on the idea that concurrency and nondeterminism (the kind of nondeterminism that we would call internal) are dual notions. Hence it is obvious that Peleg's concurrency and our external nondeterminism (note that the latter is the dual of internal nondeterminism) are analogous notions. Also intuitively this correspondence action: it is simply decided on beforehand whether the agent or the external environment makes the choice for all nondeterministic actions. As explained in section 2, the results of events are formalized using the diamond formula < do i ( ) > '. In the nondeterministic framework that we are going to de ne, truth of <do i ( )>' is intuitively taken to imply that at least one way of performing is open to agent i such that ' follows as a result. The dual notion do i ( )]' implies that all possible ways open to agent i to perform lead to '. The abilities of the agents are, cf. section 2, formalized using the formula A i . Now assume that some agent i is reasoning whether ' holds as a result of performing the internal nondeterministic choice = 1 2 . The agent could be reasoning as follows:
Since I myself make the choice as of whether to perform 1 or 2 , in order to conclude that ' holds as a result of performing it su ces that for one of 1 and 2 a way of executing exists that leads to '. This is also a necessary condition: if for neither of 1 and 2 a way of executing exists that leads to ', it is not possible that the internal nondeterministic choice between them would lead to '.'
For the reasoning of the agent concerning his/her abilities for an internal nondeterministic choice = 1 2 an analogous line of reasoning can be given:
Since I make the choice myself, in order to conclude that I am able to perform it su ces that I am able to perform one of the actions constituting . It is also necessary that I am capable of performing one of the actions, since otherwise it is not possible that I am able to perform .'
The observation given above for the internal nondeterministic choice expresses the idea that the agent thinks of her/himself as showing an angelic (cf. Bro86]) behaviour: whenever it is possible to perform an action in the correct, desired way, and the agent may choose how to perform the action, s/he will choose to perform the action in this correct way. In case of an external nondeterministic choice = 1 + 2 the agent has no in uence on which action is chosen and therefore s/he must be prepared to deal with either of the actions. In particular, the agent may not assume that the external environment will make the choice that is best for the agent, i.e., the agent should take into account that the external environment shows a demonic (also cf. Bro86]) behaviour. Now suppose that agent i is reasoning whether ' holds as a result of performing = 1 + 2 . The reasoning of the agent could proceed as follows:
Since I have no in uence whatsoever on which action is going to be chosen, it is possible that performing 1 + 2 leads to ', if and only if for both of 1 and 2 a way of executing exists that leads to '. After all I must be prepared to deal with either one of them.'
The event do i ( ) is deterministic in some possible world s from S if and only if jr(i; )(s)j 1 The event do i ( ) is deterministic for M if and only if do i ( ) is deterministic in all s from S.
The framework given in this section is indeed a deterministic one: 2.12. Lemma 
Internal versus external nondeterminism
Intuitively the meaning of a nondeterministic choice between the actions 1 and 2 is given by:`choose one of 1 and 2 , and perform the action that is chosen.' As observed in Hoa85], this intuitive description gives rise to two di erent implementations. Given the situation that the actor performing the actions is surrounded by, and strictly separated from, some external environment, it follows that in principle both the actor and the external environment could make the choice of what action to perform. Depending on who makes the choice, two di erent nondeterministic actions result. The situation as we consider it in this paper is as sketched above: a group of agents, reasoning about their abilities and the e ects of their actions, is surrounded by some unspeci ed external environment. Following Mey92], the action in which the nondeterministic choice is made by the agent itself is called internal; if the external environment makes the choice, the action is called external. The notation used in this paper is also conform Mey92]: the internal nondeterministic choice between the actions 1 and 2 is denoted by 1 2 , the external nondeterministic choice is denoted by 1 + 2 . An important di erence between the system de ned in this paper, and the systems of Mey92] and WM91], in which also internal and external nondeterminism are considered, is given by the fact that in our system the agents themselves are reasoning with and about events and abilities. This implies that the semantic de nitions of the internal and external nondeterministic choice should be such that they correctly formalize the reasoning of agents concerning their abilities and the e ects of their actions when nondeterministic choices are involved. In the other systems reasoning is only done at a meta level, by the observers. This point is elaborated on in section 3.1. Like in Mey92], and unlike WM91], the actual act of`choosing' is not considered in this paper. Since we will introduce internal and external nondeterminism separately, and hence combinations of these actions do not occur, it seems fairly reasonable to ignore the`choose' where washing his/her hair (s/he has learned how to do it, s/he is not handicapped), regardless of whether there is shampoo available. As such the combination of <do i ( )>' and A i can be used to capture the idea of being a correct (<do i ( )> ') and a feasible (A i ) plan for agent i to achieve ' (see also sections 5.2 and 6.2).
Next the de nitions of the system de ned in HLM93] are given. Although this deterministic system serves as a basis to build our treatment of nondeterminism upon, the way in which we treat nondeterminism is dependent only on the class of actions under consideration: the approach as we give it can be applied to any dynamic logic like system (as can be found in Har84], HR83], KT90], and Gol92]).
2.2. Definition. The language L is based on a given set of propositional symbols, a nite set At of atomic actions and a nite set A = f1; : : :; ng of agents. The language L is de ned by the following BNF, where ' is a typical element of the set of formulae in L, p is a typical element of the set of propositional symbols , is a typical element of the set of actions Ac, a is a typical element of the set of atomic actions At, and i is a typical element of the set of agents A. is ; n 2.3. Remark. To provide for optimal exibility no demand whatsoever is made upon the use of parentheses in L: whenever one thinks that using parentheses provides for more clarity one is encouraged to use them. Furthermore for reasons of practical convenience the sequential composition operator ; is assumed to be right associative, i.e., 1 ; 2 ; 3 should be read as 1 ; ( 2 ; 3 ). action constructors. These constructors combine two actions into a new one: the nondeterministic choice between the two actions. Although we introduce nondeterminism of composite actions, we will assume throughout this paper that the atomic actions still have a unique outcome. Rationale behind this assumption is our conviction that determinism is, together with unspeci edness, one of the main characterizations of atomicity. In this rst attempt to formalize the di erent sorts of nondeterministic operators, we have chosen to deal with them di erently and in separate ways. Nevertheless combining these operators certainly needs further consideration. The contents of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce some of our ideas concerning events and abilities that underlay the formal system of HLM93].
Furthermore the syntax and semantics of the system of HLM93], which will be used as a basis to build nondeterminism upon, are (re)introduced. In section 3 the intuition behind our approach towards nondeterminism is explained. Furthermore we compare our ideas with those of two other systems. In section 4 it is shown on the basis of two examples why the usual approaches towards nondeterminism are not suitable for our goals. In section 5 we will show how to incorporate internal nondeterminism into the system given in section 2. Section 6 contains the de nitions used to incorporate external nondeterminism. Section 7 ends this paper with some conclusions and a guideline for further research.
2. Knowledge, events, and abilities: the basic de nitions
In HLM93] a formal system is given in which, in contrast with the usual approaches in dynamic logic, the abilities of agents are considered in their own rights. The usual approach in dynamic logic when abilities are considered is to identify the ability of an agent i for an action with truth of the formula <do i ( )> tt (cf. for instance Tho93]); the latter formula intuitively captures the idea that the action is possible for agent i.
In our opinion this approach does no justice to the intuitive meaning of abilities.
2.1. Example (The shampoo example). Consider an agent planning to wash her hair.
Since there is shampoo available, <do i (wash hair)> hair clean holds, which in the usual approaches towards abilities would su ce to conclude that the agent is capable of washing her hair. The moment the last drip of shampoo leaves the bottle, < do i (wash hair) > hair clean no longer holds, and hence the agent is no longer capable of washing her hair. But this is intuitively strange: the ability of the agent seems to be something that is a property of the agent rather than a context dependent notion that depends on the presence of shampoo.
In our opinion abilities are to be considered as an additional concept, de ned independently from the diamond formulae <do i ( )> ' . We use the formula <do i ( )> ' to indicate that all mundane, action speci c, prerequisites of are satis ed and that as a result of executing , ' holds. In terms of example 2.1, if there is shampoo available, washing your hair leads to your hair being clean. The formula A i denotes the fact that the action is an element of the abilities of the agent i: the physical (mental, moral) condition of agent i is such that s/he is capable of . In terms of the example 2.1, the agent is capable of 
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We demonstrate ways to incorporate nondeterminism in a system designed to formalize the reasoning of agents concerning their abilities and the results of the actions that they may perform. We distinguish between two kinds of nondeterministic choice operators: one that expresses an internal choice, in which the agent decides what action to take, and one that expresses an external choice, which cannot be in uenced by the agent. The presence of abilities in our system is the reason why the usual approaches towards nondeterminism cannot be used here. The semantics that we de ne for nondeterministic actions is based on the idea that composite actions are unravelled in the strings of atomic actions and tests that constitute them. The main notions used in de ning this semantics are nite computation sequences and nite computation runs of actions. The results that we obtain meet our intuitions regarding events and abilities in the presence of nondeterminism.
Introduction
To investigate the reasoning of rational agents regarding correctness and feasibility of their plans we de ned in HLM93] a formal system, designed to deal with both the knowledge and abilities of agents, and the e ects of the actions performed by the agent. Based on the concepts given in Moo80] and Moo84], the system of HLM93] is rmly rooted in both epistemic logic (see MH]) and dynamic logic (see Har79] , Har84] , KT90], and Gol92]). The actions that we considered in HLM93] are deterministic: the event that consists of some agent performing some action has a unique outcome. In this paper we will consider a natural extension of the system of HLM93], given by the introduction of nondeterministic 
